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Abstract. Human behavior is one of the main problems for evolution, as it is often the case that
human actions are disadvantageous for the self and advantageous for other people. Behind this
puzzle are our beliefs about rational behavior, based on game theory. Here we show that by going
beyond the standard game-theoretical conventions, apparently altruistic behavior can be understood
as self-interested. We discuss in detail an example related to the so called Ultimatum game and
illustrate the appearance of altruistic behavior induced by fluctuations. In addition, we claim that in
general settings, fluctuations play a very relevant role, and we support this claim by considering a
completely different example, namely the Stag-Hunt game.
INTRODUCTION
Human altruistic behavior is a long-standing problem in evolutionary theory, as first
realized by Darwin himself:
He who was ready to sacrifice his life (. . . ) rather than betray his comrades,
would often leave no offspring to inherit his noble nature. . . Therefore, it
seems scarcely possible (. . . ) that the number of men gifted with such virtues
(. . . ) would be increased by natural selection, that is, by the survival of the
fittest. [1]
At the crux of the problem lies the fact that Darwin developed his theory assuming
that natural selection acts exclusively on individuals only. On this grounds, he could
not possibly understand altruistic behavior in humans, i.e., acts that decrease the actor’s
fitness while increasing that of others. Reluctantly, he had to call for selection at group
level:
A man who was not impelled by any deep, instinctive feeling, to sacrifice
his life for the good of others, yet was roused to such actions by a sense of
glory, would by his example excite the same wish for glory in other men, and
would strengthen by exercise the noble feeling of admiration. He might thus
do far more good to his tribe than by begetting offsprings with a tendency to
inherit his own high character. [1]
In fact, human behavior is unique in nature. Indeed, altruism or cooperative behavior
exists in other species, but it can be understood in terms of genetic relatedness (kin
selection, introduced by Hamilton [2]) or of repeated interactions (as proposed by
Trivers [3]). However, human cooperation extends to genetically unrelated individuals
and to large groups, characteristics that cannot be understood within those schemes.
Subsequently, a number of theories based on group and/or cultural evolution have been
put forward in order to explain altruism (see [4] for a review).
THE ULTIMATUM GAME
In order to address quantitatively the issues above, behavioral researchers use evolution-
ary game theory [5, 6] to design experiments that try to find the influence of different
factors. In this paper, we analyze this problem in the context of a specific set of such
experiments, related to the so called Ultimatum game [7, 8]. In the Ultimatum game,
under conditions of anonymity, two players are shown a sum of money, say 100 e . One
of the players, the “proposer”, is instructed to offer any amount, from 1 e to 100 e , to
the other, the “responder”. The proposer can make only one offer, which the responder
can accept or reject. If the offer is accepted, the money is shared accordingly; if rejected,
both players receive nothing. Since the game is played only once (no repeated interac-
tions) and anonymously (no reputation gain; for more on explanations of altruism relying
on reputation see [9]), a self-interested responder will accept any amount of money of-
fered. Therefore, self-interested proposers will offer the minimum possible amount, 1e ,
which will be accepted. Notwithstanding, in actual Ultimatum game experiments with
human subjects, average offers do not even approximate the self-interested prediction.
Generally speaking, proposers offer respondents very substantial amounts (50 % being
a typical modal offer) and respondents frequently reject offers below 30 % [10]. Most
of the experiments have been carried out with university students in western countries,
showing a large degree of individual variability but a striking uniformity between groups
in average behavior. A large study in 15 small-scale societies [8] found that, in all cases,
respondents or proposers behave in a reciprocal manner. Furthermore, the behavioral
variability across groups was much larger than previously observed: while mean offers
in the case of university students are in the range 43%-48%, in the cross-cultural study
they ranged from 26% to 58%.
The fact that indirect reciprocity is excluded by the anonymity condition and that in-
teractions are one-shot (i.e., repeated interaction does not apply) allows one to interpret
rejections in terms of the so-called strong reciprocity [11, 12]. This amounts to consid-
ering that these behaviors are truly altruistic, i.e., that they are costly for the individual
performing them in so far as they do not result in direct or indirect benefit. As a con-
sequence, we return to our evolutionary puzzle: The negative effects of altruistic acts
must decrease the altruist’s fitness as compared to that of the recipients of the benefit,
ultimately leading to the extinction of altruists. Indeed, standard evolutionary game the-
ory arguments applied to the Ultimatum game lead to the expectation that in a mixed
population, punishers (individuals who reject low offers) have less chance to survive
than rational players (indivuals who accept any offer) and eventually disappear. In the
remainder of the paper, we will show that this conclusion depends on the dynamics, and
that different dynamics leads to the survival of punishers through fluctuations.
THE MODEL
We consider a population of N players (agents) of the Ultimatum game with a fixed
sum of money M per game. Random pairs of players are chosen, of which one is the
proposer and another one is the respondent. In its simplest version, we will assume
that players are capable of other-regarding behavior (empathy); consequently, in order
to optimize their gain, proposers offer the minimum amount of money that they would
accept. Every agent has her own, fixed acceptance threshold, 1 ≤ ti ≤M (ti are always
integer numbers for simplicity). Agents have only one strategy: respondents reject any
offer smaller than their own acceptance threshold, and accept offers otherwise. Money
shared as a consequence of accepted offers accumulates to the capital of each of the
involved players. As our main aim is to study selection acting on modified descendants,
hereafter we interpret this capital as ‘fitness’ (here used in a loose, Darwinian sense,
not in the more restrictive one of reproductive rate). After s games, the agent with the
overall minimum fitness is removed (randomly picked if there are several) and a new
agent is introduced by duplicating that with the maximum fitness, i.e., with the same
threshold and the same fitness (again randomly picked if there are several). Mutation
is introduced in the duplication process by allowing changes of ±1 in the acceptance
threshold of the newly generated player with probability 1/3 each. Agents have no
memory (i.e., interactions are one-shot) and no information about other agents (i.e.,
no reputation gains are possible). We stress that the model is dramatically simplified;
however, we have studied more complicated versions (including separate acceptance
and offer thresholds) and the results are similar to the ones we discuss below. Another
factor we have considered is smaller mutation rates, again without qualitative changes
in the result. Therefore, for the sake of brevity we concentrate here on the simple model
summarized above and refer the reader to [13] for a more detailed analysis including
those other versions.
RESULTS
Figure 1 shows the typical outcome of simulations of our model. As we can see, the
mean acceptance threshold rapidly evolves towards values around 40%, while the whole
distribution of thresholds converges to a peaked function, with the range of acceptance
thresholds for the agents covering about a 10% of the available ones. These are values
compatible with the experimental results discussed above. The mean acceptance thresh-
old fluctuates during the length of the simulation, never reaching a stationary value for
the durations we have explored. The width of the peak fluctuates as well, but in a much
smaller scale than the position. The fluctuations are larger for smaller values of s, and
when s becomes of the order of N or larger, the evolution of the mean acceptance thresh-
old is very smooth. This is a crucial point and will be discussed in more detail below.
Importantly, the typical evolution we are describing does not depend on the initial condi-
tion. In particular, a population consisting solely of self-interested agents, i.e., all initial
thresholds are set to ti = 1, evolves in the same fashion. Indeed, the distributions shown
in the left panel of Figure 1 have been obtained with such an initial condition, and it can
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FIGURE 1. Left: mean acceptance threshold as a function of simulation time. Initial condition is that
all agents have ti = 1. Right: acceptance threshold distribution after 108 games. Initial condition is that all
agents have uniformly distributed, random ti. In both cases, s is as indicated from the plot.
be clearly observed that self-interested agents disappear in the early stages of the evo-
lution. The number of players and the value M of the capital at stake in every game are
not important either, and increasing M only leads to a higher resolution of the threshold
distribution function.
DISCUSSION
As we mentioned in the preceding section, we have observed that taking very large val-
ues for s or, strictly speaking, considering the limit s/N → ∞, does lead to different
results. In this respect, let us recall previous studies of the Ultimatum game by Page
and Nowak [14, 15]. The model introduced in those works has a dynamics completely
different from ours: following standard evolutionary game theory, every player plays
every other one in both roles (proponent and respondent), and afterwards players repro-
duce with probability proportional to their payoff (which is fitness in the reproductive
sense). Simulations and adaptive dynamics equations show then that the population ends
up composed by players with fair (50%) thresholds. This is different from our observa-
tions, in which we hardly ever reach an equilibrium (only for large s) and even then
equilibria set up at values different from the fair share. The reason for this difference
is that the Page-Nowak model dynamics describes the s/N → ∞ limit of our model, in
which between death-reproduction events the time average gain all players obtain is the
mean payoff with high accuracy. We thus see that our model is more general because
it has one free parameter, s, that allows selecting different regimes whereas the Page-
Nowak dynamics is only one limiting case. Those different regimes are what we have
described as fluctuation dominated (when s/N is finite and not too large) and the regime
analyzed by Page and Nowak (when s/N → ∞). This amounts to saying that by varying
s we can study regimes far from the standard evolutionary game theory limit. As a re-
sult, we find a variability of outcomes for the acceptance threshold consistent with the
observations in real human societies [8, 10].
In fact, fluctuations due to the finite number of games are at the heart of our results.
Among the results summarized above, the evolution of a population entirely formed by
self-interested players into a diversified population with a large majority of altruists is
the most relevant and surprising one. We will now argue that the underlying reason for
this is precisely the presence of fluctuations in our model. For the sake of definiteness,
let us consider the case s = 1 (agent replacement takes place after every game) although
the discussion applies to larger (but finite) values of s as well. After one or more games, a
mutation event will take place and a “weak altruistic punisher” (an agent with ti = 2) will
appear in the population, with a fitness inherited from its ancestor. For this new agent
to be removed at the next iteration so that the population reverts to its uniform state,
our model rules imply that this agent has to have the lowest fitness, that is the only one
with that value of fitness, and also that it does not play as a proposer in the next game
(if playing as a responder the agent will earn nothing because of her threshold). In any
other event this altruistic punisher will survive at least one cycle, in which an additional
one can appear by mutation. It is thus clear that fluctuations indeed help altruists to take
over: As soon as a few altruists are present in the population, it is easy to see analytically
that they will survive and proliferate even in the limit s/N → ∞.
THE STAG-HUNT GAME
This far, we have shown that considering that players play a finite number of games
between death-birth events in the Ultimatum game leads to results unexpected from
standard evolutionary game theory arguments. Hence, the question arises as to whether
this is a consequence of the many strategies available in the Ultimatum game (as many
as possible values for ti, 100 with our choice for the parameters) or, on the contrary,
it is a general phenomenon. To show that the latter is the case, we have considered a
completely different, much simpler kind of game: the so-called Stag-Hunt game [5, 6, 8].
In this game, two hunters cooperate in hunting for stag, which is the most profitable
option; however, hunting a stag is impossible unless both work together, and they have
the option of hunting for rabbit, less profitable, but with sure earnings. This is reflected
in the following payoff matrix (C stands for cooperation in hunting stag, D stands for
defection and hunting rabbit alone):
C D
C 6 0
D 5 1
This game belongs in the class of coordination games: In the language of game theory,
it has two Nash equilibria, (C,C) and (D,D), and the players would like to coordinate in
choosing the first one (so called payoff-dominant). However, the second one is a safer
choice because it has the largest guaranteed minimum payoff (so called risk-dominant).
We have been working on the evolutionary dynamics of this game and, specifically, on
the equilibrium selection problem [16]. For this example, we have chosen the dynamics
given by the Moran process [17], in which after s games an agent is duplicated with
probability proportional to the fitness accumulated during the s games, and another one
is killed randomly. With such a simple dynamics, it is an elementary exercise to show
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
x0
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
~ x
s = 1
s = 10
s = 100
s = 1000
s = 10000
s = 100000
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
x0
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
~ x
s = 1
s = 10
s = 100
s = 1000
s = 10000
s = 100000
FIGURE 2. Fraction of games that end up with a cooperator-only population vs density of cooperators
in the initial state for N = 100 (left) and N = 1000 (right) agents playing the Stag-Hunt game. Results are
obtained from simulations of the Stag-Hunt game with the Moran dynamics, and for every initial density
the final density is averaged over 100 games. Values of s are as indicated in the plot.
that, in the limit s/N → ∞, the whole population becomes C (resp. D) strategists if
the initial density of C strategists is larger (resp. smaller) than 1/2. As Fig. 2 shows,
simulation results for finite s are largely different from that analytical prediction: Indeed,
we see that for cooperators to prevail in the final state, an initial density larger than 1/2
is needed. In particular, for s = 1, all agents become defectors except for initial densities
close to 1 in the case N = 100 (left panel), and for all initial densities for N = 1000
(right panel) or larger (not shown). The plots also show that larger populations lead to
better statistics (meaning that curves are smoother and less noisy; it is evident that x˜
has a smaller variance for larger populations), and the trend upon increasing N is that
the curves become step functions (as should be for an infinite population). Importantly,
the effect, namely that the basin of attraction of the (D,D) equilibrium is enlarged for
finite s, persists even in the infinite population limit. In addition, it is also robust upon
changes in the dynamics: we have verified that choosing the agent to be eliminated
with probability inversely proportional to the agent’s fitness leads to qualitatively similar
result. We are thus faced with another clear-cut manifestation of the relevance of taking
the limit of infinite games before the dynamics occurs or, on the contrary, sticking to
a finite number of games. Once again, we stress that the setup is completely different
from the Ultimatum game and, as a consequence, we claim that this kind of phenomena
is generic and should be observed in many other problems.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have shown that altruistic-like behavior, specifically, altruistic pun-
ishment, may arise by means of exclusive individual selection even in the absence of
repeated interactions and reputation gains. Our conclusion is important in so far as it
is generally believed that some kind of group selection is needed to understand the
observed human behavior. The reason for that is that game theoretical arguments ap-
parently show that altruists are at disadvantage with respect to selfish individual. In
this respect, another relevant conclusion of the present work is that perspectives and
approaches alternative to standard evolutionary game theory may be needed in order
to understand paradoxical features such as the appearance of altruistic punishment. As
additional evidence supporting this claim, we have briefly discussed, in the context of
the much simpler problem of the stag-hunt game, that equilibrium selection is indeed
dramatically modified by taking into account a finite number of games. Therefore, we
conclude that the dynamics postulated for a particular application of evolutionary game
theory must be closely related to the specific problem as the outcome can be completely
different depending on the dynamics.
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